Warning: mysql_query(): Access denied for user ''@'localhost' (using password: NO) in /homepages/23/d83882051/htdocs/russland/wp-content/plugins/wp-ticker/wp-ticker.php on line 241

Warning: mysql_query(): A link to the server could not be established in /homepages/23/d83882051/htdocs/russland/wp-content/plugins/wp-ticker/wp-ticker.php on line 241

Warning: mysql_field_type() expects parameter 1 to be resource, boolean given in /homepages/23/d83882051/htdocs/russland/wp-content/plugins/wp-ticker/wp-ticker.php on line 242

Warning: mysql_field_type() expects parameter 1 to be resource, boolean given in /homepages/23/d83882051/htdocs/russland/wp-content/plugins/wp-ticker/wp-ticker.php on line 243
Monat: Februar 2011 - russland.NEWS - russland.TV

Gorbatschow: Keine Geldforderung für litauische Unabhängigkeit

Der letzte sowjetische Präsident Michail Gorbatschow hat Vorwürfe zurückgewiesen, er habe eine enorme Summe für die Unabhängigkeit Litauens gefordert. Zwar habe er versucht, das Land davon zu überzeugen, Teil der Sowjetunion zu bleiben, es habe jedoch kein „Feilschen“ gegeben, sagte Gorbatschow der russischen Nachrichtenagentur Interfax.

Einer freigegebenen schwedischen Diplomatendepesche von März 1990 zufolge, aus der die baltische Nachrichtenagentur Baltic News Service zitierte, soll Gorbatschow 21 Milliarden Rubel (damals etwa 26 Milliarden Euro) für die Unabhängigkeit des Landes gefordert haben.

„Das ist schlichtweg Spekulation und eine überaus freie Interpretation der Ereignisse, die stattfanden, als Litauen die UdSSR verlassen wollte“, sagte Gorbatschow. Er habe sich mit dem damaligen Chef der Kommunistischen Partei in Litauen, Algirdas Brazauskas, getroffen und ihn vor den Gefahren eines Bruchs mit Moskau gewarnt, sagte Gorbatschow und deutete an, ähnliche Gespräche mit führenden Politikern in Lettland und Estland geführt zu haben, die sich ebenfalls abspalten wollten. Die Umsiedlung von Menschen sowie territoriale Fragen hätten unweigerlich viel Geld gekostet.

Der Diplomatendepesche zufolge forderte Gorbatschow für den Aufkauf von Unternehmen und Industrieanlagen 21 Milliarden Rubel und bestand zudem darauf, dass die litauische Stadt Klaipeda Teil des russischen Kaliningrads (Königsberg) werden solle, da dort viele Russen lebten.

Litauen hat als erste Sowjetrepublik von Moskau losgesagt und damit den Zerfall der Sowjetunion eingeläutet. Diese versuchte zunächst, Litauen mit einer Wirtschaftsblockade wieder unter ihre Kontrolle zu bringen. Als dies fehlschlug, schickte Moskau Panzer nach Vilnius. Am 13. Januar 1991 töteten die Truppen am Fernsehturm der Stadt 14 Zivilisten, 700 Menschen wurden verletzt. Gorbatschow wird seither in Litauen äußerst kritisch gesehen.




Gorbatschow wettert gegen Russische Staatsführung

Der letzte sowjetische Präsident Michail Gorbatschow hat die russische Staatsführung in ungewöhnlich scharfer Form als „reich und verdorben“ kritisiert. „Die Führungsspitze verhält sich empörend“, sagte Gorbatschow in einem am Mittwoch veröffentlichten Interview mit seiner Zeitung „Nowaja Gaseta“.

Er warf dem Kreml vor, gegenüber der Bevölkerung Gleichgültigkeit an den Tag zu legen. Die führende Klasse sei „reich und verdorben“, ihr Vorbild sei der Milliardär und Fußballclub-Besitzer Roman Abramowitsch, sagte Gorbatschow. „Ich missachte dieses Ideal. Ich schäme mich für diese Ausschweifungen“, sagte der 79-Jährige.

Ein Mangel an Demokratie führe dazu, dass immer mehr Fachkräfte das Land verließen, sagte Gorbatschow, der auch die fehlende Meinungsfreiheit in Russland erneut bemängelte. Wenn die Menschen nicht mehr „vom Zaren, vom Ministerpräsidenten“ abhängig wären, würden sie auch nach Russland zurückkehren. Allerdings sei das Leben in Russland nicht von einer Demokratie bestimmt, sondern von Autoritarismus, in dem die Menschen und ihre Freiheiten kontrolliert würden, führte Gorbatschow aus. Er warf dem Kreml zudem vor, ihn an der Bildung einer sozialdemokratischen Partei gehindert zu haben.

Fast zwei Jahrzehnte nach dem Zerfall der Sowjetunion strich der Ex-Staatschef die seiner Ansicht nach in Vergessenheit geratenen Errungenschaften des Umbruchs hervor. „Damals haben wir die Freiheit geschaffen, die die Menschen heute genießen, wenn sie in die Kirche gehen, Visa beantragen, im Internet surfen oder Zeitungen kaufen“, sagte Gorbatschow, der die oppositionelle „Nowaja Gaseta“ gemeinsam mit dem Oligarchen Alexander Lebedew besitzt.

Gorbatschow genießt im Westen zwar ein hohes Ansehen. In seiner Heimat allerdings kommt ihm kaum noch Bedeutung zu. Viele Russen machen Gorbatschow für den Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion und das danach einsetzende Chaos verantwortlich.




Datenleck in Brüssel – USA belauschten NATO-Generalsekretär Rasmussen in Sachen Russland

Ein Maulwurf im Büro des NATO-Generalsekretärs hat die USA über einen längeren Zeitraum hinweg über dessen Handeln informiert. Wie die norwegische Zeitung „Aftenposten“ unter Berufung auf US-Depeschen der Enthüllungswebseite Wikileaks berichtete, kopierte der Informant vertrauliche Dokumente und berichtete Washington von Gesprächen, deren Inhalt nicht für die Öffentlichkeit bestimmt waren. Dies habe der US-Regierung erlaubt, in ihrem Sinne auf den NATO-Chef Einfluss zu nehmen.

Nach Angaben der Tageszeitung „Aftenposten“, welche Zugriff ohne Klauseln auf alle US-Depeschen erlangte, gab der Maulwurf im September 2009 die Kopie eines Briefes weiter, in dem NATO-Generalsekretär Anders Fogh Rasmussen der von Russland dominierten Organisation des Vertrags für Kollektive Sicherheit (OVKS) eine engere Zusammenarbeit vorschlug. US-Außenministerin Hillary Clinton habe daraufhin bei Rasmussen interveniert und ihn zur Aufgabe der Pläne gedrängt: „Wir bitten Sie dringend, die Überlegungen nicht voranzutreiben, indem Sie neue Initiativen zwischen Russland und der Nato ankündigen, die noch formal von der Allianz beraten werden müssen.“

Im Dezember 2009 informierte die Quelle in Rasmussens Büro Washington über den Inhalt eines Gesprächs mit dem russischen Ministerpräsidenten Wladimir Putin in Moskau. Der US-Depesche aus dem Büro des US-Botschafters bei der Nato, die sich auf eine „allgemein verlässliche Quelle“ beruft, ist zu entnehmen, dass das Gespräch entgegen der öffentlichen Darstellung nicht „konstruktiv“ verlief, sondern Putin dem Gast aus Brüssel gleich zu Beginn sagte, dass die NATO keine Existenzberechtigung mehr habe. „Die Quelle hat behauptet, Putin habe Rasmussen, bevor er ihn bat, sich zu setzen, mit der Beschuldigung konfrontiert, die Nato plane die Aufstellung von Raketen in Bulgarien, und von ihm weitere Informationen verlangt. Das hat den NATO-Generalsekretär offenbar völlig überrascht, obwohl die Quelle nicht berichtet hat, wie er geantwortet hat.“ An einer Zusammenarbeit mit der NATO habe Putin kein Interesse gezeigt.

Der US-Maulwurf reichte dem Bericht zufolge auch die Kopie eines Briefs von Russland an Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien vom Oktober 2008 zum Europäischen Sicherheitsvertrag weiter. Der damalige NATO-Chef Jaap de Hoop Scheffer habe das Dokument erst nach mehrmaligen Bitten von Berlin erhalten. Die US-Botschaft bei der Nato berichtete: „Das folgende Dokument wurde uns inoffiziell zur Verfügung gestellt von einem Mitarbeiter (strikt zu schützen) im Privatbüro von Nato-Generalsekretär de Hoop Scheffer. Laut Privatbüro ging das Dokument ursprünglich von den Russen an die EU-3 und wurde ausschließlich dem Generalsekretär zugänglich gemacht. Es kursiert nicht formell innerhalb der Nato. Bei diesem Dokument ist die Art und Weise, wie mit ihm umgegangen wurde, interessanter als sein Inhalt.“

Weder NATO-Generalsekretär Anders Fogh Rasmussen noch sein Vorgänger Jaap de Hoop Scheffer kommentierten den Fall auf Anfrage von „Aftenposten“ – da er auf Wikileaks zugespielten Dokumenten basiert.

[ 06.01.2010 – ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON SYG,S MOSCOW TRIP ALLEGE PUTIN SPARRED ON MISSILE DEFENSE ]

[ 21.12.2009 – NATO-RUSSIA: SECRETARY GENERALS TRIP TO MOSCOW ]

[ 28.09.2009 – RESPONDING TO NATO SECRETARY GENERALS PROPOSALS FOR NATO RUSSIA COOPERATION ]

[ 10.09.2009 – NATO SECRETARY GENERAL READY TO REACH OUT TO CSTO? ]

[ 23.10.2008 – RUSSIANS PROVIDE EUROPEAN SECURITY PAPER TO EU-3 ]




Wikileaks: 06.01.2010 – ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON SYG,S MOSCOW TRIP ALLEGE PUTIN SPARRED ON MISSILE DEFENSE

S E C R E T USNATO 000004
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, NATO, RS
REF: 09 USNATO 595
Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

1. (S) A usually reliable source on January 5 conveyed additional details to us about NATO SYG Anders Fogh Rasmussen,s December 17 interactions in Moscow with President Medvedev and PM Putin that were not reflected in the SYG,s report on the visit (reftel).

Based on information from someone present at the Moscow meetings, the source reported that while Russian President Medvedev was polite, neither he nor PM Putin had expressed any real interest in cooperating with NATO. Putin allegedly told Rasmussen that NATO no longer has a purpose and it was in Russias interest that NATO no longer exist.

2. (S) The source claimed that in the SYG meeting with the PM, Putin had not let Rasmussen sit down before challenging him with the allegation that NATO planned to put missiles in Bulgaria, and demanding further information. This reportely threw the SYG off balance, although the source did not indicate how he responded.

3. (C) Private Office Deputy Director Signe Brudeset maintained the same positive tone as the SYG,s trip report, when queried whether START or missile defense were discussed during the Moscow visit. PM Putin and President Medvedev focused on the European Security Initiative, she said, adding that FM Lavrov had observed that Russia was not in debt to the United States for the U.S. change in missile defense plans in the Czech Republic and Poland. In her view, Medvedev and Putin had decided for the time being to try to „play ball“ with NATO to see if it could be useful or beneficial to Russia.
HEFFERN




Wikileaks: 21.12.2009 – NATO-RUSSIA: SECRETARY GENERALS TRIP TO MOSCOW

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000595
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, NATO, RS
USNATO 00000595 001.2 OF 003

1. (U) Below is a written summary provided by Secretary General Rasmussen of his December 15-17 visit to Moscow. The SecGens schedule included meetings with President Medvedev, Premier Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, and Russian Parliamentarians. He also visited NATOs Information Office and Military Liaison Mission in Moscow and gave a speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). We will report septel regarding how Allies will follow-up on the SecGens visit.

2. (U) Text of written summary:

3. (SBU) My visit to Moscow took place in a constructive and forward-looking atmosphere. I met with President Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov, the Secretary of the Security Council Patrushev, the Chairman of the Federation Council Mironov, and the Chairman of the State Duma Gryzlov. I found my interlocutors well disposed to cooperation with NATO, and ready for a constructive dialogue on a wide range of issues, including on those where we disagree.

4. (SBU) I delivered the following messages to Moscow: Russia is one of my top priorities as NATO Secretary General. Allies remain committed to improving relations, as well as broadening cooperation in the NRC. NATO and Russia are now facing common threats and challenges, in particular in Afghanistan and stemming from issues such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy. Therefore, we need to unite our efforts in order to face them more efficiently. The Joint Review on 21st Century Common Security Challenges will allow us to identify our common threats. Based on the Review, we can proceed to broaden our practical cooperation using the new and reinvigorated NRC structure. I underlined that timely and efficient implementation of the three Ministerial deliverables will be crucial and that we rely on the full and productive engagement of the Russian side in this process.

5. (SBU) My interlocutors underscored their commitment to the full-fledged resumption of NATO-Russia relations and their intention to quickly and effectively implement the three deliverables agreed by NRC Foreign Ministers on 4 December. Russia seems ready to broaden and deepen cooperation with NATO, including in the military sphere, despite current disagreements on some key issues.

6. (SBU) With regard to Afghanistan, I underscored the need to strengthen our cooperation and asked Russia for further contributions in three concrete areas:

7. (SBU) First, a comprehensive helicopter package: I asked my interlocutors to consider donations of helicopters to the Afghan National Army. Training of Afghan helicopter pilots by Russian instructors within the NRC framework could be an additional useful contribution. Additionally, I proposed that Russia consider the provision of helicopter spare parts, maintenance and fuel as part of such a package.

8. (SBU) Second, based on the on-going Russian assistance to Afghan security forces, I asked Moscow to consider expanding training of Afghan police forces in its centers of excellence, within the framework of the NRC.

9. (SBU) Third, building on the successful experience of the NRC Project on Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel, consider expanding further the scope of the Project by following up on the Afghan authorities request for longer in-country training of counter-narcotics personnel.

10. (SBU) I underlined that a positive reaction by the Russian Federation would underscore our joint commitment to contributing to the Afghan Governments efforts aimed at the stabilization of the country, as well as highlighting the new and constructive atmosphere in the NATO-Russia Council. I also urged the Russian side to consider NATOs June 18 invitation to re-deploy one ship in Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR.

11. (SBU) President Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin and Minister Lavrov all agreed with the need to do more on Afghanistan, and underscored Russias determination to support the NATOs ISAF mission (sic). President Medvedev tasked the relevant Russian agencies to consider my concrete proposals for additional contributions. Minister Lavrov was optimistic about possibilities related to joint training of Afghan police, and an eventual extended in-country counter-narcotics training of the Afghan security forces. He was, however, more cautious on the feasibility for a positive decision on the „helicopter package“. Prime Minister Putin underlined that if NATO expected donations, this would have effect on the budget of the Ministry of Defence, something which would take time to sort out. Still, he affirmed that the proposals would be given serious consideration.

12. (SBU) All interlocutors asked NATO to consider positively CSTOs request for establishing formal relations with NATO, and referred to the fact that several allies already participate as observers to CSTOs annual drug interdiction operation „Kanal“ conducted on Afghanistans Northern border. Furthermore, Minister Lavrov signaled that Russia would expect to participate in relevant meetings, such as those conducted in the 28 5 1 format, although he did not explicitly mention participation in ISAF meetings. Lavrov and President Medvedev further suggested possible joint logistics cooperation in repairing the tunnel on the Uzbek-Afghan border. Minister Lavrov underlined that next years London conference should be used better in terms of raising more tangible contributions for Afghanistan, and in terms of emphasizing the regional dimension also by broader inclusion of China and India.

13. (SBU) President Medvedev underscored Russias interest in pursuing cooperation on counter-piracy with NATO, but did not specify how. On Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, Minister Lavrov reiterated that there are no political obstacles to Russias reintegration, although a deployment has not been envisioned in 2010 for budgetary reasons. However, ships transiting the Mediterranean for anti-piracy duty off Somalia could possibly participate in OAE on short-term basis.

14. (SBU) Turning to more contentious issues in our relations, I reiterated the Alliance positions on Georgia, CFE and NATOs Open Door policy. I maintained that the Open Door Policy has actually benefited Russia by providing stability along its Western borders and increased economic opportunities. I emphasized the need to be creative and forward-looking in seeking mutually acceptable solutions to these issues. I pointed out that activities, such as the recent large scale military exercises did not contribute to the climate of transparency and confidence building we have been aiming for since our joint decision to re-launch NRC relations.

15. (SBU) President Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin and Minister Lavrov all spoke about what Russian authorities perceive as continued military build-up by Georgia, with the assistance of some Allies, which, they claimed, undermined stability in the region. Prime Minister Putin pointed out that the Russian troops that had „suppressed“ the Georgian aggression had long left the territory of Georgia beyond Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and, that Russia had fulfilled its commitments under the cease-fire agreement. Further, he maintained that the EU commissioned report had concluded that Georgia started the August 08 war. Approximately 100 Russian peacekeepers had been killed, and in his view Russia had had no option but to act.

16. (SBU) On NATOs Open Door policy, Minister Lavrov pointed out that while Russia respected the OSCE principle that all states are free to choose their security affiliations, Article 10 of the Washington Treaty was a product of the run-up to the Cold War and NATO should consider its implications in the current European context. Georgias perception, rightly or wrongly, that the country was well on its way to NATO membership had only encouraged irresponsible behavior. The Foreign Ministers recent decisions on MAP with regard to Bosnia Hercegovina and Montenegro were not mentioned by any interlocutors.

17. (SBU) As regards the new Russian draft Agreement on Basic Principles governing Relations Among NRC Members in the Security Sphere, presented by Minister Lavrov at the NRC Foreign Ministers meeting, as well as the draft European security treaty initiated by President Medvedev, it struck me that Minister Lavrov appeared to be very well-informed about the contents of our confidential discussion at 28 that we had at the beginning of this week. I informed the Russian side that Allies were now examining closely these drafts. I also pointed out that Allies questioned the need to re-cast in a legally binding form already existing joint commitments, such as the indivisibility of security, which are contained in documents such as the 1999 Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE Charter, as well as in the Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. Therefore, the existing security arrangements in Europe provide a comprehensive and sufficient framework in which each countrys security interests can be addressed effectively.

18. (SBU) Mr. Medvedev and Mr. Putin explained that Russia was seeking legally binding documents, as, in their view, the existing political assurances were not sufficient in preventing, for example, last years Georgian aggression on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In relation to the draft NRC agreement, Minister Lavrov pointed out that Russia had long sought to define „substantial combat forces“ referred to in the Founding Act. Following the Alliances long-standing reluctance to do it, Russia felt compelled to suggest a starting point for such negotiations. He added that Russia would be ready to renew negotiations on the Parallel Action Package and the future of the CFE regime. Minister Lavrov also noted, however, that Russia was not considering a resumption of its obligations under the CFE at the current time.

19. (SBU) Prime Minister Putin, in his turn, tied the need for progress on CFE to the proposed European Security Treaty. He led me to understand that lack of progress on the CFE front had forced Moscow to table the proposed treaty on European Security, as it in his view was clear that Allies have no legal reason not to ratify the CFE treaty, but had made a political decision not to do so. END TEXT.
HEFFERN




Wikileaks: 28.09.2009 – RESPONDING TO NATO SECRETARY GENERALS PROPOSALS FOR NATO RUSSIA COOPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000413
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2019
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, RS
REF: USNATO 400
Classified By: Charge John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

1. (U) This is a Request for Guidance by OOB Brussels, September 30. Please see para 2.

2. (C) NATO Secretary General Rasmussen proposed during his September 18, 2009, speech on NATO-Russia relations that NATO and Russia undertake a „joint threat assessment“ and that the NATO Russia Council (NRC) serve as a forum to discuss the European Security Treaty (reftel).

Discussion of these topics is likely to occur at an informal NAC luncheon on September 30, when we expect the SecGen to explain how he intends to move forward on the initiatives raised in his speech. We request Departments initial reaction and guidance as to how to respond to these initiatives:
— Joint Threat Assessment (JTA): The SecGen proposed undertaking a „joint review of NATOs and Russias common threats and challenges,“ to serve as an analytical platform from which to enhance practical cooperation. This proposal has raised concern among certain NATO members. Allies have suggested that a NATO-Russia JTA should be limited to counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, missile defense, nonproliferation, and maritime security, the very areas the SecGen laid out in his speech as priorities for NATO-Russia cooperation. Unless otherwise directed, we will tell the SecGen that Washington is not yet in a position to agree to discuss this issue with Russia in the NRC. We will note that we need more information regarding a number of questions in order to make a more informed decision on whether/how to move forward. These include: If we go forward, what parameters should be set for the activity and what information/intelligence could we share with Russia through the NRC.
— Discussion of European Security Treaty (EST): The SecGen recognized in his speech that the OSCE was the primary forum for discussion of the EST, but stated that a NATO-Russia dialogue on this issue „could provide real added value.“ He did not elaborate on how he intended to go about this other than to say that it was necessary to develop a European security architecture in which Russia saw itself „reflected“ and did not feel marginalized. Unless otherwise instructed, we will indicate that any NATO-Russia conversation on the EST must wait until after December in order to allow the Corfu Process to run its course.
HEFFERN




Wikileaks: 10.09.2009 – NATO SECRETARY GENERAL READY TO REACH OUT TO CSTO?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000383
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, NATO, RS
REF: USNATO 348
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 4.

2. (C) Summary: NATO Secretary General Rasmussen may be planning to take improved NATO-Russia relations to a new level by proposing that NATO engage with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The SecGen recently indicated that he has an „open mind“ to such a course of action, has been in contact with the head of the CSTO, and plans to make a speech on NATO-Russia relations that would go beyond most Allies comfort zones. Engaging with an organization initiated by Moscow to counter NATO and U.S. influence would be counterproductive at a time when we should focus on enhancing relations with Russia bilaterally and as an alliance. NATO-CSTO engagement would likely lead to the same bloc-on-bloc dynamic that manifested during the Cold War, and further increase Moscows influence over our Central Asian partners, countries we should actively court through NATOs Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). End summary.

3. (C) NATO Secretary General Rasmussen may encourage NATO engagement with the Russian-led CSTO in order to advance his priority to improve NATO-Russia relations. We believe that the SecGen will soon broach this topic, possibly at a September 15 PermReps meeting devoted to Russia and/or during a speech on NATO-Russia relations the SecGen intends to give in the near future. Our supposition is based upon the following developments:
— The SecGen told the press on August 31 that he had an „open mind“ toward „all ideas“ intended to improve relations with Russia in response to a question about Zbigniew Brzezinskis recent proposal that NATO reach a security cooperation agreement with the CSTO as a means to draw Russia closer into the Euro-Atlantic community. In the same interview, Rasmussen urged NATO to form a „strategic partnership“ with Russia in order to address common security threats.
— The SecGen sent CSTO Secretary General Nikolay Borduyzha an August 24 letter thanking him for an earlier message in which Borduyzha offered Rasmussen congratulations on his appointment as NATO SecGen. We understand that Rasmussen had his letter delivered to Borduyzha through Russian Ambassador to NATO Rogozin. Rasmussens brief message (a copy of which was provided by a member of the NATO International Staff (strictly protect)) thanked the CSTO chief for his „kind letter“ of August 1, noted that he had taken over NATO at a time when the „organization is faced with a wide range of challenges,“ and concluded that „NATO is well placed and well equipped to meet these challenges.“ We have not seen Borduyzhas initial letter to Rasmussen.
— Rogozin encouraged NATO-CSTO engagement in the non-paper delivered to the SecGen during their August 11 meeting, during which the often pugnacious Rogozin appears to have charmed Rasmussen (reftel). The SecGen intends to discuss the response to the Russian non-paper at a September 15 PermReps lunch devoted to NATO-Russia issues, and could propose following through on Rogozins NATO-CSTO initiative.
— Rasmussen intends to address the topic of improving NATO relations with Russia, one of his stated priorities as SecGen, in an upcoming speech that a member of the NATO International Staff told us would probably „go further than many Allies, including the United States, will be comfortable with.“ We do not have details on the speech, which is one of several thematic addresses the SecGen intends to give laying out his vision for NATO. (Note: Rasmussen is scheduled to give a speech on Russia at the Carnegie Center Brussels on September 18. End note.)

4. (C) Should the SecGen propose NATO-CSTO engagement, this action will significantly up the ante on Rasmussens initiative to improve NATO-Russia relations. Understanding that arguments could be made for NATO to engage on some level with the CSTO, we believe that such a proposal, which would face significant resistance from some Allies, should be initiated through a consensus of NATO members rather than the SecGen. We request Departments guidance in order to respond to any proposals the SecGen may make for NATO-CSTO engagement.

5. (C) Comment: We maintain that while NATO strives to enhance its engagement with Russia, including cooperation that could lead to practical results such as greater Russian assistance to Afghanistan, it would be counterproductive for NATO to engage with the CSTO, an organization initiated by Moscow to counter potential NATO and U.S. influence in the former Soviet space. To date, the CSTO has proven ineffective in most areas of activity and has been politically divided. NATO engagement with the CSTO could enhance the legitimacy of what may be a waning organization, contributing to a bloc-on-bloc dynamic reminiscent of the Cold War. Instead, we should focus our efforts on improving the U.S. relationship with Russia bilaterally and through NATO.

6. (C) Comment continued: In addition, validation of the CSTO could further strengthen Moscows influence over our Central Asian and other partners in NATOs EAPC. All the members of the CSTO are in the EAPC, which we believe is the proper venue in which to engage them.
DAALDER




Wikileaks: 23.10.2008 – RUSSIANS PROVIDE EUROPEAN SECURITY PAPER TO EU-3

S E C R E T USNATO 000393
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2018
TAGS: NATO, PREL, GM, RS
Classified By: CDA W.S. Reid for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (S/NF) The following document was provided to us unofficially by a staffer in the Private Office of NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer (strictly protect). According to the Private Office, the document was initially provided by the Russians to the EU-3. Germany, in turn, shared it with the Secretary General only. It is not in circulation at NATO formally.

2. (S/NF) Commment: This document is more remarkable for how it has been handled than for its content — which is a rehash of ideas we have seen from the Russians many times before. The Dutch learned of the documents existence and informed the SYG, per Private Office sources. He asked the U.S. to provide it to him after a request to Germany confirmed the documents existence, but also a refusal to share it with him. When we told him we did not have a copy, he doubted our answer and went back to the Germans. At that point the Germans briefed De Hoop Scheffer on the document, but they still refused to give him a copy. They did tell him, however, that three other Allies had it. He took this to mean that it was a Quad document, an impression of which Germany did not disabuse him. When Germany refused to give it to him, he once again asked us for it. When we repeated that we did not have such a paper, he reportedly expressed doubts about our answer, believing that we were deliberately holding out on him. As a result, he went back to the Germans a third time, who finally admitted the true source of the document. They also eventually provided him a copy of the paper, we understand. End Comment

3. (C/NF) The text of the Russian-drafted European Security Paper follows below:

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Such Treaty should create in the Euro-Atlantic area a reliable collective security system that would provide for equal security of all States, stipulate in a legally binding manner the foundations of the interaction between its Signing Parties – States as well as international organizations – with the goal of strengthening peace, enhancing stability and providing for security in Europe and in the world as a whole. Key thematic elements of such a Treaty:
— Basic principles of relations between States, including adherence to the implementation in good faith of obligations under international law; respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of States; inviolability of frontiers, possibility of their change only in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement; non-interference into internal affairs.
— Reaffirmation of the principle of inadmissibility of the use of force or threat of use of force in international relations in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
— Unified approaches in the Euro-Atlantic area to the peaceful settlement of conflicts with the particular emphasis on the priority of negotiated solutions based on the due consideration of the positions of the parties and respect to the existing international negotiating and peacekeeping mechanisms.
— Obligations of all States and international organizations not to maintain their own security at the detriment to the security of others, to observe the principles of equal and indivisible security.
— Reaffirmation that no State or international organization in the Euro-Atlantic area is vested with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and stability in this region or a right to consider any part of it as an area of their exclusive influence.
— Basic principles of arms control regime in Europe, confidence and security building, restraint and reasonable sufficiency in the military development in the Euro-Atlantic area.
— New quality of cooperation as to counteracting new threats and challenges, such as, for example, WMD proliferation, terrorism, violent separatism, drug trafficking and other kinds of transnational crime.
— Affirmation that all States in the Euro-Atlantic area would not allow, in the framework of any military union, organization or coalition, any actions undermining the unity of the Euro-Atlantic security space and that the evolution of such military unions, organizations or coalitions would be carried out, inter alia, on the basis of respect of security interests of every participating State of this Treaty.
REID